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GENERAL OVERVIEW 
 
hristopher Mole’s offering is an ambitious 
undertaking, encompassing discussions of 
computational complexity, metaphysics, epistemology, 
cognitive science and philosophy of mind. All this it does at 
a slim 182 pages. On occasion, this brevity comes at the cost 
of assuming a lot of the reader. Explanations of complex 
issues are compact, and the overall argument proceeds at a 
C 
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quick pace. These explanations are grounded extensively in 
context of intellectual history. In particualr, Mole often 
returns to the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Iris 
Murdoch, and Gilbert Ryle. These authors’ works focus on 
the constraints everyday roles, experiences, and activities 
place on theoretical accounts. This influence forms the 
guiding thread of Mole’s argument. At the end of the day, 
The Unexplained Intellect is an impressive work, which 
makes an interesting and novel contribution to the literature 
on the nature of intelligent behavior.  
 
The objective of the book is to argue in favor of a process-
based account of intelligent behavior which falls broadly 
under the auspices of an embodied/embedded/extended 
philosophy of mind. To accomplish this, Mole sets out to: a) 
provide a definition of the phenomenon of intelligent 
behavior; b) provide reason to doubt an extant, dominant 
account of intelligent behavior; and 3) develop a new 
account which explains intelligent behavior in terms of 
temporally extended processes rather than transitions 
between discrete states. 
 
 In Part 1, Mole articulates what he takes to be an accurate 
and theoretically helpful definition of intelligent behavior. 
Briefly, an agent displays intelligence when they act in a way 
that “… [satisfies] complex rational constraints [regulating a 
performance]” (p. 11, original emphasis). Moreover, Mole 
manifests his sympathy with the 
embodied/embedded/extended view of mind by arguing that 
intelligence is not a separate mental phenomenon which 
abstractly manages processes like perception and action—
but they way in which they mutually support each other. 
Next, he proceeds to discuss the problems posed for 
computational accounts of intelligence by the complexity of 
constraints on performing actions like checking sets of 
beliefs for coherence. This negative argument creates space 
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for the work of the next three parts, which comprise Mole’s 
positive argument. 
 
In Part 2, Mole stresses the importance of temporal 
orientation for the explanation of some mental phenomena. 
Here, the notion of “temporal chirality” is developed to 
describe mental phenomenon which are always “directed” a 
certain way in time. Temporal chirality, in turn, is used to 
explain a notion of epistemically encountering propositions. 
This relates to the problem posed in Part 1 regarding 
checking sets of beliefs for coherence. Mole states that 
temporal orientation is key to determining when an agent’s 
set of beliefs successfully satisfies the myriad constraints of 
rationality.  
 
In Part 3, Mole argues for the metaphysical fundamentality 
of processes over states in accounting for mental 
phenomenon. The process of metaphysically “leveraging” 
one sort of entity from another is used to demonstrate that, 
at least for key mental phenomenon, one can profitably 
explain states in terms of processes—but not processes in 
terms of states. 
 
In Part 4, builds directly on the work of Parts 2 and 3 to argue 
that a process-based philosophy of mind gives the best 
account of intelligent behavior. Mole argues that three 
distinctive phenomena in the philosophy of mind—
perception, action, and inference—are best explained in 
terms of dynamic, extended epistemic encounters with 
agents’ environments. 
 
In the remainder of this review, we will look more closely at 
the load-bearing parts of Mole’s argument.  
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PART 1 
 
The first part of The Unexplained Intellect is likely to be the 
most challenging for readers. Whereas most will be familiar 
with the general outline of a computational approach to 
issues in the philosophy of mind, many will not be fluent in 
the concepts of theoretical computer science. However, it is 
indispensable to Mole’s argument that the ramifications of 
computer scientist’s results concerning complexity are 
understood. The relevant concepts and results are: P-
complexity, NP-complexity, 3SAT, the Church-Turing 
thesis, and the Cobham-Edwards thesis. All of these bear 
upon classifying computation problems in terms of whether 
they are solvable and/or checkable in feasible ways. Here, 
“solvable” and “checkable” refer to whether there can be 
found optimal solutions to problems (like the infamous 
Three-Color Problem). Mole notes that quotidian intelligent 
behavior, like rationally managing beliefs sets, is in the set 
of NP-hard problems: i.e., problems for which computing an 
optimal solution would require unfeasibly many steps. What 
is meant by “unfeasibly many” here is arbitrarily, or 
infinitely, many steps such that finding a solution is at least 
physically impossible. Given that agents do manage to 
accomplish such intelligent operations, Mole argues that this 
suggests standard computational explanations of intelligence 
are not in the offing.  
 
After making this point, Mole anticipates and addresses a 
number of replies. He deals with the idea that non-classical, 
quantum computing might provide profitable ways to 
explain intelligent behavior; and, he deals with the idea that 
the results of theoretical apparatuses regarding optimal 
solutions don’t apply to intelligent agents like humans, who 
deal mostly in non-optimal solutions.  
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With respect to quantum computing, Mole poses a dilemma. 
Either the behavior of agents is not subject to quantum 
effects and so quantum mechanics has no bearing on 
computational accounts of intelligence, or the behavior of 
agents is subject to such effects and there is no need for any 
account of intelligence. The first horn is straightforward. On 
the interpretation where quantum effects are limited to the 
super small scale, “ … warmish and interactive [places] 
where quantum computing cannot take place” (p. 29). The 
second horn relies on the idea that the need for an 
explanation of  intelligent behavior only exists when large 
scale states and events cannot exist in the superpositions 
characteristic of quantum phenomenon. Mole contends that. 
if large scale states can be superpositioned, then agents do 
not act to satisfy complex (often conflicting) constraints, but 
instead take all possible routes (including the optimal ones) 
in one world or another.  
 
Regarding the difference between optimal and sub-optimal 
solutions, Mole argues that this makes no substantial 
difference. In the various ways that intelligent agents might 
approximate optimal solutions, such solution would still 
take unfeasible amounts of time.  
 
Having listed the problems with computational explanations 
of intelligence, Mole discusses why activities like rational 
management of a belief set prove so difficult for theoretical 
computer science. Intelligent behavior largely deals with 
responding to abstract, global features of particular 
situations. Moreover, intelligent agents are able to respond 
to a wide variety of global features and develop ways to 
respond to novel features. The best explanation for this, 
claims Mole, involves a move towards 
embedded/embodied/extended theories of cognition. Here, 
the claim takes shape in a now familiar way. Agents’ 
cognitive abilities are structured in such a way as to rely on 
Essays in Philosophy 17(2) 
 
227 
 
features of their environment. What would be impossible for 
an agent to do entirely with their internal resources, becomes 
possible when they rely on other agents and the environment. 
Mole’s particular inspiration for this perspective comes from 
an appreciation of the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The 
ultimate goal of Mole’s analysis is to understand intelligent 
behavior “… as being built up of from the environmentally 
engaged operations of an embodied system” (p. 66).  
 
PART 2 
 
The second part of the book explores the importance of 
agents’ temporal situatedness for explaining features of 
psychological states. Crucially, Mole claims that, “[a] past-
to-future temporal orientation therefore seems to be essential 
to having a mind in which knowledge is achieved and 
intentions are formed” (p. 70). Thus, if Mole can show that 
such temporal orientation requires appealing to dynamic 
(rather than static) mental phenomenon, then he will have 
shown that some phenomenon characteristic of intelligent 
behavior demand just the sort of explanation he offers.  
 
Mole’s argument relies a lot on linguistic constructions and 
our intuitions about them to do work. The central claim is 
that there are “temporally chiral” attitudes which help to 
explain agents’ epistemic relations to evidence. Temporal 
chirality is the phenomenon in which certain attitudes are 
always oriented in only one temporal “direction”: i.e., past-
ward, present-ward, or future-ward. For example, 
remembering is temporally chiral with respect to the past and 
expectation is temporally chiral with respect to the future. 
Importantly, this applies only to non-propositional attitudes, 
according to Mole. Whereas agents can remember that it will 
rain tomorrow, they cannot now remember the rain 
tomorrow. 
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That chirality is a feature of the non-propositional but not the 
propositional is leads Mole to make his point about agents’ 
epistemic relationship to evidence. While agents can 
remember that it will rain tomorrow, this remembrance is 
based on an epistemic encounter with some event: say, a 
weather report. An agent heard the report earlier in the day, 
and remembering having heard the report—the content of 
which was tomorrow’s weather—can now remember that it 
will rain tomorrow. The point is that, the temporal features 
of content do not engender chirality; instead, it is an agent’s 
relationship to some event. (Ultimately, Mole will give his 
general account in terms of propositions—but that comes 
later.) 
 
To drive home the point, Mole applies his notion of temporal 
chirality to the distinction between episodic and semantic 
memory in psychology. The best way to explain the 
difference between episodic and semantic memory, argues 
Mole, is their epistemic character.  
 
The difference between the temporally chiral episodic 
memories and the temporally achiral episodic ones is … that 
the object of semantic memory is, unlike the object of an 
episodic memory, is a proposition. This difference is crucial 
because a proposition is the sort of object that can be 
epistemically encountered as the conclusion of an 
argument” (p. 91: original emphasis). 
 
The content of an argument’s conclusion can pertain to any 
time, irrespective of when the argument itself was 
encountered by an agent. But, eventually, all agents’ beliefs 
will be related to epistemic encounter with an event—the 
past-to-future orientation of evidence to beliefs. This 
encounter will be temporally chiral, and so Mole concludes 
that the temporal chirality is crucial to understanding the 
temporal orientation of intelligent behavior.  
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PART 3 
 
The third part of the book consists of extensive work in 
metaphysics. Mole starts by addressing the annoyance or 
discomfort metaphysics engenders in many contemporary 
readers. While it is not the main point of the work, the 
defense Mole gives of metaphysics as an important and 
serious endeavor is convincing and accessible. Appealing to 
Iris Murdoch’s on metaphysics and morality, Mole 
highlights the ubiquity of metaphysical issues in both 
philosophical and scientific explorations. As an example, he 
discusses the idea of “leveraging” the existence of events 
like football matches from the existence of entities like 
football leagues. Further, properties of objects—like a cup 
being a league trophy—are leveraged from the existence of 
leagues. The point is that the creation of properties and 
events is routine, and the existence of leveraging 
relationships between them is uncontroversial. Given that 
this is so, Mole concludes that there is no significant problem 
in deploying metaphysical machinery to make progress on 
the problem of accounting for intelligence.  
 
The specific work Mole wants to use metaphysical 
machinery for is to show that mental states should not be the 
fundamental entities in the philosophy of mind for the 
explanation of intelligent behavior. Central to this effort is 
the example of melody perception. “To have responded to a 
sequence of notes is not yet to have registered anything about 
the relations among those notes, and to the melody itself 
these relations are essential” (p. 116). Harkening back to Part 
1, being a melody is one of the global properties that 
intelligent agents are capable of responding to. Not only does 
the idea of a melody as a collection of notes not seem to do 
justice to the thing itself, but it also does not do justice to the 
experience of hearing a melody. Both the metaphysical and 
phenomenological aspects are important to Mole 
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throughout. However if we take the extended, dynamic 
entity that is a melody as fundamental, there is not a problem 
of understanding—either metaphysically or 
phenomenologically—individual notes. That is, it is easier 
to leverage individual notes from melodies than it is to 
leverage melodies from a collection of notes (and their 
relations to each other).  
 
PART 4 
 
In the final part of the book, Mole brings everything together 
to make his positive argument. He gives precise 
formulations of when agents’ epistemically encounter 
propositions, argues that encounters are dynamic, and then 
analyzes several crucial phenomenon in the philosophy of 
mind in terms of dynamic encounters.  
 
Here, Mole wants to say that the x which is encountered does 
not have to be an event: indeed, propositional encounters are 
argued to be fundamental.  
 
A subject epistemically encounters an event, per se, if an 
only if the subject encounters a proposition pertaining to the 
event in a way that it is influenced by the event itself (p. 129). 
 
Mole insists that encountering an event can only be properly 
epistemic when an agent has a propositional thought content 
pertaining to the event. The idea here is that non-
propositional thoughts are not apt for being true or false, and 
hence cannot play an evidential role.  
 
The above definition of an epistemic encounter is then 
generalized as follows.  
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carolineA subject epistemically encounters x only when that 
subject’s x-regarding conduct proceeds in a way that is 
determined by the form of x (p. 130). 
 
The idea of being determined by the form of x is explained 
not in terms of causation, but influence. This is required to 
avoid being tied to claiming that abstract entities like 
propositions can cause things. Mole claims that there is 
nothing problematic with his notion of formal determination 
by with the following. 
 
The 17-year cicada avoids recurrent predation; an 
explanation of the way in which it does so must advert to the 
proposition that 17 is a prime number. The polar bear has 
evolved to have white fur. An explanation of the way in 
which it has done so must advert to the proposition that snow 
is white (p. 132). 
 
Next, Mole argues that encounters must be thought of as 
dynamic rather than static. When an agent is epistemically 
encountering some proposition in a particular way, they are 
engaged in a temporally extended process. Returning to the 
example of melody perception, the idea is that an agent 
encounters the proposition that this is ‘The Star-Spangled 
Banner’ by way of hearing a person singing it at the 
beginning of a baseball game. The event of hearing, and thus 
the way the agent is related to the relevant proposition, is 
temporally extended. As we saw in Part 3, (perceptions of) 
melodies cannot be leveraged out of the (perceptions of) 
individual notes. Thus, an account in terms of states is seen 
to be inadequate, and an account in terms of processes is 
required. Moreover, the example of melody perception 
already gives us an example of perception being explicable 
in terms of dynamic epistemic encounters.  
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Beyond perception, Mole also aims to explain intentional 
action and inference in terms of dynamic epistemic 
encounters. The details of these arguments won’t be 
discussed here. The remainder of Part 4 mainly deals with 
demonstrating how Mole’s account of dynamic epistemic 
encounters can do important work in philosophy of mind and 
epistemology. The final issue to be examined here is Mole’s 
own concluding remarks about his project.  
 
The original goal set out in Part 1 was to provide a 
satisfactory account of intelligent behavior in the face of the 
inadequacy of popular computational explanations. Mole’s 
positive account aims to provide such an explanation in 
terms of dynamic epistemic encounters. The general 
definition of intelligence that has operated throughout is 
performing activities requiring the satisfaction of complex 
constraints. In the last sections of Part 4, Mole discusses 
high-level activities such as belief revision, interpersonal 
relationships and professional roles. All of these are 
accomplished through intimate engagement with others 
agents and the environment. The impetus to this sort of 
explanation comes from Mole’s reliance on Mzerleau-Ponty, 
Murdoch, and Ryle. However, Moles makes it his own by 
cashing-out the notions of embodiedness and embeddedness 
in terms of dynamic epistemic encounters with the world.  
 
[Our] capacity for the intelligent pursuit of truth requires all 
our faculties for its explanation. An active rapport with 
world is essential to any intelligence that could be physically 
explicable. That rapport is amor the most basic of mental 
phenomena. It is the proper foundation on which to build a 
theory of the mind (p. 168). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The Unexplained Intellect paints, overall, a compelling 
picture. Mole brings together considerations from diverse 
subject matters and methodological approaches, and 
synthesizes them into a clear positive account of intelligent 
behavior.  
 
 In a few spots, Mole moves perhaps too quickly and 
explains things in an unsatisfactory fashion. For example, 
the discussion of computational complexity and the jargon 
of theoretical computer science assumes a more substantial 
understanding of these issues than the general reader of this 
book might possess. (This is a personal observation, based 
on the author’s own background knowledge.)  
 
Another instance presents more of a difficulty. When Mole 
refines his account of epistemic encounters in Part 4, he 
argues that the metaphysical fundamental type of encounter 
is of propositions, rather than events. Subsequently, when 
the notion of formal determination is explicated, Mole 
insists, “The 17-year cicada avoids recurrent predation; an 
explanation of the way in which it does so must advert to the 
proposition that 17 is a prime number” (p. 132). That 
propositions can do this sort of explanatory work is 
important, but is not given an explanation in proportion to its 
importance—neither in the main text or notes.  
 
There is no doubt that The Unexplained Intellect will 
generate a great deal more discussion about philosophical 
accounts of intelligence. Both the negative argument against 
computational explanations, and his own positive account of 
dynamic encounters, provide rich ground for others explore. 
